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Abstract 
Despite a growing scholarly interest in risk management within the field of 
hospitality, risk appetite, which plays a key role in effective risk management, has not 
yet received wider attention. This paper contributes to our understanding of risk 
appetite by exploring the factors that influence risk appetite in a hotel company 
context. Through in-depth interviewing with risk appetite experts and corporate-level 
hotel executives, we identified two sets of factors (‘primary’ and ‘secondary’) that 
influence a hotel compan’s risk appetite. Although, at corporate level, these factors do 
not differ from other industry contexts, they can be used by managers in the hotel 
sector as a starting point to understand drivers and inhibitors of their companies’ risk 
appetite while researchers can use them as a basis to develop descriptive or predictive 
models of a hotel company’s risk appetite. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The vulnerability of hospitality organisations to a wide range of risks has sparked 
a growing scholarly interest in corporate-level risk management, with particular focus 
on systematic and non-systematic risk (Chen, 2013; Kim et al, 2012; Vivel-Búa et al, 
2018), risk perception (Waikar et al., 2016) and mitigation strategies (Gjerald and 
Lyngstad, 2015). This vulnerability has increased as the industry continually 
witnesses risk-taking activities by major hotel groups, mostly in the area of mergers 
and acquisitions (Falk, 2016) but also in the adoption of new technology in product 
and service innovations (Hu et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2016). While risk taking is 
important in achieving a company’s goals, it is even more crucial to ensure that 
appropriate types of risk are taken and at the appropriate levels (Bromiley et al., 
2015). Taking inappropriate types of risk or taking too much risk could put a 
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company on the verge of collapse, whereas taking too little risk could mean the 
company is not capitalising on available resources to maximise returns (Lam, 2014). 
In order to determine an optimal level of risk taking, decision makers and risk 
managers must understand their company’s risk appetite which is defined as the types 
and amount of risk a company is willing to take in order to achieve its objectives 
(Alix et al., 2015; Lamanda and Voneki, 2015). 
Risk appetite has been recognised as a key consideration in a company’s risk 
management and strategic decision-making process (Gontarek, 2016). It has become a 
central concept in the business world as publicly-listed companies (including hotel 
companies) are increasingly asked by corporate governance regulators to produce a 
formal ‘statement’ elucidating their risk appetite (Baldan et al., 2016). While every 
company has an inherent appetite for taking risk, recognising it and evaluating its 
appropriateness in a conscious manner has been a major challenge for decision 
makers (Bromiley et al., 2015). We argue that one way to tackle this challenge is to 
identify and comprehend the factors that determine risk appetite. An in-depth 
understanding of such factors will not only help companies better articulate their risk 
appetite statement but will also facilitate more effective risk monitoring and review as 
well as allow the identification of risk appetite ‘levers’ (i.e. factors over which a 
company has direct control), which can be used by senior management to proactively 
modify the company’s risk appetite. 
Despite its prevalence among practitioners, risk appetite has received very little 
research attention in academia and yet no studies have been undertaken to explore the 
factors that influence it. Existing studies on risk appetite are largely conceptual and 
exist mostly in the field of finance and economics (Etula, 2013; Hassani, 2015), 
where the focus has been on debating the meaning of the concept (Aven, 2013), 
highlighting its role in risk management (Gontarek, 2016) and presenting different 
approaches to developing a risk appetite statement (Baldan et al., 2016; Berlinger and 
Varadi, 2015). In the field of hospitality, although there is a growing risk management 
literature with particular emphasis on risk perception (Le and Arcodia, 2018; Wen and 
Kwon, 2017) and risk treatment strategies (Gjerald and Lyngstad, 2015; Waikar et al., 
2016), the concept of risk appetite has not yet been explored at any depth. Given the 
important role that risk appetite plays in bridging risk perception and risk treatment 
(Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012), as well as in serving as a reference point for risk 
prioritisation and resource allocation (Lam, 2014), this exploratory study makes a 
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distinctive contribution to the literature on risk management by identifying and 
exploring the factors that determine the risk appetite in a hotel company context. 
The paper begins by defining the concept of risk appetite and to do so it 
integrates different strands of literature related with risk taking in order to develop a 
conceptual framework of factors that may determine a company’s risk appetite. The 
framework is refined and enriched by the findings of interviews, first with ten 
international consultants considered as ‘risk appetite experts’ and then with sixteen 
corporate executives from two major hotel groups. The paper ends with a series of 
conclusions as well as recommendations for practitioners and directions for further 
research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 The concept of risk appetite 
 
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the business world has seen an exponential 
growth in the use of the term ‘risk appetite’ (Gontarek, 2016). Companies in various 
industries are now asked by corporate governance regulators to clearly articulate their 
risk appetite in their corporate reporting (Bromiley et al., 2015). It is believed that the 
more thorough discussion among board members about how much risk they are ready 
to take, can help companies make more conscious and informed choices in risk taking 
(Aven, 2013) and can effectively restrain any extreme risk-taking behaviours, so 
prevalent among large companies prior to the 2008 financial crisis (Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2012). 
Nevertheless, academic research on risk appetite remains limited. Existing studies 
on risk appetite were mostly conducted in finance and economics (Muralidhar and 
Berlik, 2017), where scholars often equate risk appetite with conventional terms such 
as ‘risk aversion’, ‘risk tolerance’ or ‘risk preference’ and define it as an investor’s 
willingness to buy risky assets (Dupuy, 2009; Gai and Vause, 2006). These scholars 
also tend to view risk appetite as an individual-level, rather than organisational-level 
concept, primarily associated with taking investment risk (Belghitar and Clark, 2012; 
Kaufmann et al., 2013). In business management, there is a growing number of 
studies on risk appetite (Aven, 2013; Bromiley et al., 2015; Gontarek, 2016), yet there 
is no agreement on its definition. For example, while Gontarek (2016, p. 123) defines 
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risk appetite as ‘the written articulation of the aggregate level and types of risk that a 
firm will accept or avoid, in order to achieve its business objectives’, Aven (2013, p. 
465) describes the concept differently as ‘the willingness to take on risky activities in 
pursuit of values’. 
Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition (Lam, 2014), a common 
understanding of the concept appears to be the company’s desire for risk taking to 
achieve its objectives (Bromiley et al., 2015). However, this desire cannot be simply 
described with generic terms such as ‘risk-averse’ or ‘risk-seeking’ (Aven, 2013). 
Depending on the types of risk under consideration and the specific circumstances, 
this desire for risk-taking can be multidimensional and dynamic (Hillson and Murray- 
Webster, 2012). For example, a hotel company may have ‘zero appetite’ for guest 
safety risks such as food poisoning, yet it may be willing to take a  significant 
financial risk by approving a major acquisition. The same company, at a different 
time, may have a small risk appetite for acquisitions due to a lack of financial capital 
or management capability. In this sense, many of the existing risk appetite definitions, 
such as Gontarek’s (2016) and Aven’s (2013), have failed to capture this multi- 
dimensional and time-horizon features that characterise risk appetite and have led 
many corporate executives to the misconception that a company’s risk appetite is 
static and can somehow be expressed by a single metric. For this reason, the current 
study approached risk appetite as a company’s dynamic desire for risk taking to 
achieve its objectives at a particular point in time. A different point in time will see 
different circumstances to the company and so will the types and amount of risk the 
company will desire to take. 
 
2.2 Risk appetite determinants 
 
 
Scholars from various fields, primarily from finance/economics and psychology, 
have developed several prominent theories to explain the risk-taking behaviour of 
individuals and companies. For example, theories such as the Expected Utility Theory 
(Schoemaker, 1982), Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and Mood 
Maintenance Theory (Isen and Patrick, 1983) indicate that wealth, risk perception, 
and emotion are key factors that drive individual risk taking. Other theories such as 
the Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963), the Threat-rigidity 
Thesis (Staw et al., 1981), the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), the Behavioural 
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Agency Model (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and the Upper Echelons Theory 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) maintain that company performance, executive 
remuneration and the risk propensity of the CEO, the Board and the Executive 
Committee are key determinants of a company’s risk taking. 
These factors have been supported by subsequent studies seeking to test those 
theories. For example, company performance has been found to have a significant 
effect on firm risk taking depending on whether the performance meets the desired 
target (Chen and Millier, 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Shimizu, 2007). Executive 
remuneration, particularly in the form of cash bonuses and stock options, has been 
noted as an important driver of firm risk taking (Eisenmann, 2002; Wright et al., 
2007). Moreover, the risk-taking propensity of individual senior managers in 
company Boards (Belghitar and Clark, 2012; McNulty et al., 2013; Sahaym et al., 
2016) and their emotions (Delgado-Garcia et al., 2010; Fessler et al., 2004) have also 
been identified as drivers of a company’s risk-taking behaviour as a reflection of its 
leaders’ characteristics and preferences. Kull et al. (2014) and Panzano and Roth 
(2006) showed that the nature and level of a risk can either drive or inhibit a company 
to take it. 
Other factors that may influence a company’s risk appetite have been found to be 
the company’s strategic objectives (Bhatta, 2003; Rittenberg and Martens, 2012), the 
company’s size (Bhagat et al., 2015; Mattana et al., 2015) and its competition 
(Jimenez et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2012) as drivers of risk-taking behaviour whereas 
government or industry regulation (Cohen et al., 2013; Hoque et al., 2015) as an 
inhibitor for risk-taking. The company’s risk-taking history (track record) (Bouwman 
and Malmendier, 2015; Kaufmann et al., 2013) and its stakeholders’ pressure 
(Chatzinikoli and Toner, 2009; Govindarajan, 2011) have been identified as both 
drivers and inhibitors, depending on the circumstances at a specific point of time. 
While these studies have identified a wide range of factors, they do not relate to 
each other and consequently, our understanding of the determinants of risk taking is 
not complete and is confined to only how a single factor influences risk taking. There 
are, however, some studies that take a comprehensive view to investigate the effect of 
multiple factors on risk taking. For example, Baird and Thomas (1985), Bhatta (2003) 
and Pablo and Javidan (2002) synthesised existing literature and proposed conceptual 
models of factors that influence company risk taking. While their models displayed a 
wide range of similar factors, they went further and grouped the factors into distinct 
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categories, relating mostly to elements and attributes of the company, individual and 
team characteristics of the decision makers and external forces within the industry and 
wider business environment. In another study, taking a grounded-theory approach, 
Harwood et al. (2009) identified ten determinants of a company’s risk taking, 
although the labelling of those determinants was quite different from the rest of the 
literature. Table 1 synthesises the relevant literature and presents the determinants of a 
company‟s risk appetite classified as internal and external. 
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Determinants 
 
Potential relationship with risk appetite 
 
Sources 
Internal 
  
Performance Well-performing companies take less risk; Under- 
performing companies take increased risk but tend to 
be risk-averse when low performance threatens their 
survival. 
Chen and Miller, 2007; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Shimizu, 2007 
Objectives Risk-taking driver; the ambitiousness ness of 
objectives is positively associated with risk appetite. 
Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Bhatta, 2003; Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012 
Firm size Risk-taking driver Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Bhagat et al., 2015; Mattana 
et al., 2015 
History of risk 
taking 
Past success in risk taking increases risk appetite; past 
failure in risk taking decreases risk appetite. 
Bouwman and Malmendier, 
2015; Carpenter et al., 2003; 
Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Risk perception Positively (negatively) perceived risk decreases 
(increases) risk appetite. Level of perceived risk 
negatively influences risk appetite. 
Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Kull et al., 2014; Panzano 
and Roth, 2006 
Board risk 
propensity 
Risk-taking driver Belghitar and Clark, 2012; 
Bhatta, 2003; Pablo and 
Javidan, 2002 
Executive 
Committee risk 
propensity 
Risk-taking driver Bhatta, 2003; Pablo and 
Javidan, 2002 
CEO risk 
propensity 
Risk-taking driver McNulty et al., 2013; 
Sahaym et al., 2016 
CEO emotions Risk-taking driver Delgado-Garcia et al., 2010; 
Fessler et al., 2004 
Executive 
remuneration 
Risk-taking driver Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Eisenmann, 2002; Wright et 
al., 2007 
External 
  
Stakeholder 
demands 
Depending on which stakeholder and the nature of the 
demand, the risk appetite may increase or decrease. 
Chatzinikoli and Toner, 
2009; Govindarajan, 2011 
Competition Risk-taking driver. Baird and Thomas, 1985; 
Jimenez et al., 2013; 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 
2010; Tabak et al., 2012 
Regulation Risk-taking inhibitor Cohen et al., 2013; Hoque et 
al., 2015 
Table 1. Factors that may determine risk appetite 
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To develop the conceptual framework of risk appetite determinants that would 
inform our fieldwork, we further segregated the ‘internal’ determinants into 
‘organisational’ and ‘decision-maker’ and re-labelled the ‘external’ to 
‘environmental’ determinants as presented in Fig. 1. This categorisation is consistent 
with other studies (Pablo and Javidan, 2002; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2012) and 
highlights the role that individual decision makers can play in a company‟s risk 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of determinants of risk appetite 
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
 
3.1 Stage One 
 
 
This stage involved key informant interviews (Altinay et al. 2016) with risk 
consultants known for their expertise on risk appetite and their active involvement in 
projects, conferences and debates on this concept. Key informants normally need to 
occupy critical roles in their field and have a mastery of the specialised knowledge 
relevant to the study (Adema and Roehl, 2010). Seventeen key informants based in 
the UK, the US and Australia, were identified using a specific set of inclusion criteria: 
the person must have publications on risk appetite; be regarded globally as a leading 
risk appetite consultant; and, be a frequent speaker in risk appetite-related 
conferences, seminars and workshops. Ten of them (seven in UK – later coded as 
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UK1, UK2, …, UK7 and three in the US – US1, US2 and US3) accepted the 
invitation and were interviewed. In-depth, unstructured interviews were used for data 
collection with one initial question: ‘In your view, what are the factors that determine 
a company’s risk appetite?’ The subsequent interventions depended largely on the 
informant’s answer. A range of probes and other techniques were used to achieve 
depth of answer in terms of penetration, exploration and explanation (Legard et al., 
2003). 
The interviews lasted between 45 to 88 minutes, were digitally recorded, 
transcribed verbatim and member-checked (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), with all 
amendments considered as primary data. The transcripts were imported to NVIVO10 
for analysis, drawing upon the approach of Miles and Huberman (1994). The coding 
included a combination of deductive and inductive processes: the deductive process 
started with agreeing a general coding framework based on factors depicted in the 
conceptual framework. We created a ‘node’ for each factor and labelled them using 
the exact same ‘name’ (such as ‘objectives’, ‘performance’ and ‘Board risk 
propensity’). We then read through all transcripts to highlight key words, sentences 
and paragraphs related to those factors and placed them into the corresponding nodes. 
Following this activity of deductive coding, all transcripts were coded again 
inductively to allow for the identification of new nodes emerging from the data. We 
focused on sentences and paragraphs that could not be labelled using existing nodes, 
for which we created new ‘nodes’ and labelled them in the same term as they were 
mentioned by informants (such as ‘risk culture’, ‘risk capacity’ and ‘leverage’). We 
then compared and compiled all deductively and inductively extracted nodes and 
grouped them hierarchically under the main categories of the conceptual framework: 
‘organisational’, ‘decision-maker’ and ‘environmental’ factors (see Appendix 1 for a 
screenshot of the ‘node tree’). This coding process was agreed between all researchers 
and each researcher independently coded the transcripts. The NVIVO nodes that 
emerged from these independent analyses were compared with an inter-coder 
reliability rate of 72.6%, which is more than acceptable (Olson et al., 2016). We 
recorded the number of times each factor was mentioned through all transcripts as 
well as the number of consultants that mentioned the factor (presented in Table 2). 
Each researcher then read and re-read the coded excerpts within each node to generate 
an understanding of the informants’ accounts in relation to each factor. 
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3.2 Stage Two 
 
 
Having established a set of factors that determine a company’s risk appetite, the 
second stage of the study sought to explore those factors in the context of hospitality 
using two international hotel groups. The two hotel groups (hereafter ‘company A’ 
and ‘company B’) are among the world’s largest, each running several thousands of 
hotels under a diverse portfolio of brands. Despite their commonalities in scale, 
business model and customer segments, the two hotel groups had displayed very 
different risk appetites between 2009 and 2015. More specifically, in areas such as 
‘geographic markets’, ‘speed and diversity of brand development’ and ‘approach to 
risk management’, company A appeared consistently risk-averse and behaved 
conservatively, whereas company B appeared more ‘hungry’ for risk and behaved 
more aggressively. 
Sixteen corporate-level executives out of the twenty approached (eight from each 
company, coded later as A1, A2, …, etc. and B1, B2, …, etc.) participated at this 
stage. The sample size was deemed sufficient because the population with in-depth 
knowledge and experience to discuss risk appetite is mostly limited to Board of 
Directors and Executive Committee. These informants were selected using purposive 
sampling among the two hotel groups’ executives tasked to articulate their company’s 
risk appetite. Their job titles included Senior Vice President (SVP) Global Risk 
Management, Vice President (VP) Global Internal Audit, SVP Procurement, VP 
Corporate Safety and Security, VP Corporate Communications, Public Relations and 
Reputation Management, VP Legal and VP Corporate Tax. 
Prior to the interview, a short questionnaire that listed potential determinants of 
risk appetite was handed to the informants, who were asked: a) to indicate whether 
each factor influenced the risk appetite of their company (Yes/No); b) to rate the level 
of importance of a factor to risk appetite on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very low and 5 
= very high); and, c) to indicate the nature of the influence (i.e. increase risk appetite 
or decrease risk appetite). The purpose of the questionnaire was to identify key issues 
to be clarified in the ‘follow-up’ semi-structured interview. The interview questions 
focused on their views on factors that determine their company’s risk appetite. They 
were also asked if they felt that some determinants were missing from the 
questionnaire. The interviews lasted on average 50 minutes each. 
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The analysis of the questionnaire focused on identifying the most important 
factors affecting risk appetite and any ‘unexpected’ answers that deviated from or 
disconfirmed the literature. All questionnaire responses were transferred onto a 
summary for comparisons. To evaluate the importance of a factor to risk appetite, the 
average rating per factor was calculated. Factors with an average rating of more than 
‘3’ were considered as ‘more important’, and those that were equal or less than ‘3’ 
were considered ‘less important’. To determine the nature of the influence, the answer 
that  represented  the  majority of  the  responses  in  the  company was  treated  as the 
‘common’ view.  Factors  on which  informants unanimously agree  were  labelled as 
‘undisputed’, and those where there was no clear consensus in the company were 
noted as ‘disputed’. This allowed the classification of all factors into four categories: 
‘more important/disputed’, ‘more important/undisputed’, ‘less important/disputed’ 
and ‘less important/undisputed’. This categorisation informed the analysis of the 
interview data, which was based on common codes, including ‘importance to risk 
appetite’ and ‘nature of influence’ for each factor. 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
 
4.1 Stage One findings 
 
 
The first stage of the study aimed to validate the conceptual framework by 
identifying factors that determine a company’s risk appetite from a generic business 
perspective (risk consultants with expertise on risk appetite). As can be seen from 
Table 2, all factors in the conceptual framework were confirmed, with objectives, 
history of risk taking and performance being identified by all ten consultants. On the 
other hand, decision-maker related factors such as CEO emotions and Board risk 
propensity have only been mentioned by four informants. This is slightly surprising as 
these two factors were commonly recognised in the literature as key risk-taking 
drivers of a company (Belghitar and Clark, 2012; Delgado-Garcia et al., 2010). 
However, this may be offset by the broader agreement on Executive Committee risk 
propensity (confirmed by seven informants), as informants commented that it is the 
Executive Committee’s task, rather than the Board of Directors or the CEO alone, to 
articulate a company’s risk appetite. 
12  
Factors Number of mentions 
Number of consultants 
mentioned 
Objectives 35 10 
History of risk taking 24 10 
Performance 22 10 
Risk capacity 20 10 
Competition 24 9 
Risk culture 21 9 
Risk management capability 14 9 
Stakeholder demands 22 8 
Executive committee risk propensity 19 7 
Executive remuneration 12 7 
Regulation 12 6 
CEO risk propensity 9 6 
Firm size 7 4 
CEO emotions 6 4 
Board risk propensity 5 4 
Leverage 2 2 
Risk perception 2 2 
 
Table 2. Risk Consultants’ views on factors that determine risk appetite 
 
 
Another key finding in stage one was the emergence of four new determinants: 
risk capacity, risk culture, risk management capability and leverage. 
Risk capacity was a determinant factor mentioned by all ten informants and, as 
explained by US3, it refers to ‘the absolute maximum amount of risk a company is 
able to take in financial/monetary means’. It serves as a ‘legitimate upper limit’ which 
risk appetite must not exceed, as otherwise the company would be taking more risks 
than it could afford, hence exposing itself to bankruptcy. Regarding how risk capacity 
influences risk appetite, the analysis revealed two views. Four informants maintained 
that change in risk capacity does not influence risk appetite, because risk capacity 
only serves as a benchmark to assess whether risk appetite has been set at appropriate 
levels. However, the other six informants argued that if risk appetite is always lower 
and not equal to risk capacity, this may be interpreted by investors as board’s inability 
to optimise company resources risking the label of ‘overly conservative board’ (UK2, 
US1). Most informants suggested a positive correlation between risk capacity and risk 
appetite. 
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Risk culture was identified by nine informants as a key determinant of risk 
appetite, and broadly understood as a company’s shared values and beliefs about risk 
and its role in organisational decision making. Several informants argued that each 
company’s risk culture depends on its unique organisational ‘make-up’. UK4 referred 
specifically to ‘vision and mission, history, structure and employees’ whereas US2 
said that it is the risk culture that ‘determines the particular types of risk a company 
favours to take on and the amount it is comfortable with’. Nevertheless, none of the 
informants was absolutely clear about how risk culture affects risk appetite (‘it 
depends’ on the circumstances being the most common answer without much more 
explanation), making this question more intriguing for the second stage of the study. 
Risk management capability was also identified as a determinant factor by nine 
informants. Most of them elaborated that risk management capability is a broad and 
multi-dimensional construct, which encompasses ‘the awareness of risk at all 
organisational levels’ (UK4, UK5) and ‘the risk management skills and know-hows’ 
(UK7). Whilst eight informants noted that risk management capability determines the 
specific types of risk a company is willing to take, because it highlights ‘the core 
competences of a company and the specific risks it has the specialty to manage’ 
(UK5), informants US1 and UK6 cautioned that a clear understanding of a company’s 
risk capability ‘could, but not necessarily would’, lead to taking a particular type of 
risk because the company may not have sufficient risk capacity to support the desired 
activity. Equally, a company with a large risk capacity may have a poor capability in 
identifying and controlling risks, and as a result may not be able to take any risk. This 
finding suggests that risk capacity and risk management capability are two factors that 
work in tandem in driving risk appetite. 
Leverage was a determinant factor identified by only two informants (US3, UK5) 
and explained as ‘the amount of debt used to fund a company’s operation’ (US3). 
Whilst an increasing amount of debt strengthens the company’s financial capital, our 
study informants argued that a highly leveraged company tends to be very prudent in 
risk taking, because any unnecessary risk-taking decisions, if turn out to be 
unsuccessful, could significantly undermine the company’s ability to repay its debt. 
On the other hand, a company with a low level of debt does not have such a concern 
and thus might be more comfortable to exploit emerging opportunities and taking 
increased risk. 
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4.2 Stage Two findings 
 
 
Having established a set of factors that determine a company’s risk appetite in the 
first stage of the study, the second stage further explored those factors in the context 
of hotel companies. Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 present the responses from both 
companies to each of the three research questions: a) whether each factor influenced 
the risk appetite of their company (Yes/No); b) the level of importance of a factor to 
risk appetite on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very low and 5 = very high); and, c) the 
nature of the influence (i.e. increase or decrease risk appetite). 
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4.2.1 Confirmation/disconfirmation of factors that influence risk appetite 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, all hotel executives agreed that objectives, CEO 
risk propensity, Executive Committee risk propensity and Board risk propensity 
influence their company’s risk appetite. There is also a broad consensus that factors 
like risk culture, executive remuneration, history of risk taking, competition, risk 
capacity, risk management capability, performance, stakeholder demands and risk 
perception influence risk appetite. 
 
 
Factors 
Company A Company B Total (A+B) 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Objectives 8 0 8 0 16 0 
CEO risk propensity 8 0 8 0 16 0 
Executive Committee risk propensity 8 0 8 0 16 0 
Board risk propensity 8 0 8 0 16 0 
Risk culture 8 0 7 1 15 1 
Executive remuneration 8 0 7 1 15 1 
History of risk taking 7 1 8 0 15 1 
Competition 8 0 6 2 14 2 
Risk capacity 8 0 6 2 14 2 
Risk management capability 8 0 6 2 14 2 
Performance 7 1 7 1 14 2 
Stakeholder demands 7 1 6 2 13 3 
Risk perception 6 2 6 2 12 4 
Regulation 6 2 4 4 10 6 
CEO emotions 2 6 7 1 9 7 
Firm size 4 4 4 4 8 8 
Leverage 5 3 1 7 6 10 
 
Table 3. Hotel executives’ views on factors influencing risk appetite 
 
 
There are no major differences between the executives from company A (more 
risk-averse) and company B (more risk-seeking). It is interesting to note that quite a 
number of informants from both companies did not see leverage, firm size, CEO 
emotions and regulation as key determinants of risk appetite in their companies. 
Leverage was a factor that only two consultants supported in Stage One and, in 
Stage Two, more hotel executives dismiss it than support it as a factor that influence 
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risk appetite. While five executives from company A acknowledged the factor, seven 
of their counterparts in company B denied its effect on risk appetite. According to 
informant B7, the main reason seems to be related to the fact that company B has a 
very low level of debt, which does not create ‘any extra burden’ on the company in 
terms of fulfilling repayment obligations. However, B5 made a rather interesting point 
by saying that even if a company has a high level of leverage, the nature of the 
company, i.e. being a limited liability entity, would exempt decision makers from 
being held liable for any financial loss, therefore the risk appetite ‘should not be 
affected by leverage at all’. He also added that for other losses resulting from 
‘reckless risk-taking’ there is the Directors and Officers liability insurance (also 
known as ‘D&O’) which is payable to the company’s senior management, as 
indemnification (reimbursement) for losses from a legal action brought for wrongful 
acts in their capacity as directors and officers. The legal status of the company may 
indirectly be related with its size where opinions were equally divided among hotel 
executives. 
Regarding CEO emotions, i.e. the CEO‟s personality and mood, the two 
companies had quite opposing views: while in company B executives believe CEO 
emotions influences risk appetite, most executives in company A believe it does not. 
According to company A executives, the low influence of CEO emotions on risk 
appetite is due to the fact that their CEO ‘understands well enough that decisions 
cannot be made emotionally’ (A4) but ‘rationally and collectively’ (A1, A3). Also, 
company A has ‘a comprehensive decision-making mechanism’ with ‘multiple levels 
of checks and approvals’ (A6) that is designed to minimise emotional influence on 
key decisions. In contrast, four informants from company B commented that the 
company’s current and previous CEOs were all highly emotional individuals, whose 
‘mood, temper, and attitude have had a major influence on the strategies we take’ 
(B2). It is evident that, although the corporate governance structures in the two 
companies are the same (dictated by the stock markets where they are both listed), 
their organisational culture differs and, as a consequence, the CEO’s personality on 
decision making has a different impact - a finding consistent with other studies on risk 
taking (Belghitar and Clark, 2012; Delgado-Garcia et al., 2010) 
 
4.2.2 Importance of factors to risk appetite 
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Table 4 presents the average ratings of the hotel executives of how important 
each of the framework factors is in the shaping of their company‟s risk appetite. 
Based on these ratings, all factors were grouped into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
categories. ‘Primary’ factors include factors that are common to both companies and 
which are highly likely to exhibit a significant influence on risk appetite. We argue 
that these primary factors are essential considerations for understanding a hotel 
company’s risk appetite. In contrast, ‘ secondary’ factors contain those which are 
‘more important’ to one company but are ‘less important’ to the other. We argue that 
they complement the primary factors in understanding the determinants of risk 
appetite. Such an importance-based categorisation offers a more structured approach 
for prioritisation and analysis of factors that determine risk appetite as well as 
addresses a limitation in the extant literature, where different factors were assumed to 
be equally important in determining risk appetite. 
 
 
 Average rating (Importance)  
Factors   Total average 
 Company A Company B  
Primary    
Objectives 4.125 4.5 4.3125 
CEO risk propensity 4 4.125 4.0625 
Risk capacity 3.875 4 3.9375 
Risk culture 3.875 3.571 3.723 
Stakeholder demands 3.428 4 3.714 
Executive Committee risk propensity 3.75 3.625 3.6875 
Executive remuneration 3.5 3.833 3.6665 
Firm size 3.5 3.667 3.5835 
Performance 3.286 3.714 3.5 
Regulation 3.5 3.5 3.5 
History of risk taking 3.143 3.75 3.4465 
Secondary    
Leverage 4 3 3.5 
Risk management capability 2.875 3.833 3.354 
Board risk propensity 3.5 3 3.25 
Competition 3 3.5 3.25 
CEO emotions 3 3.167 3.0835 
Risk perception 1.667 3.167 2.417 
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As shown in Table 4, on average, all factors were rated with more than ‘3’ expect 
risk perception which received the lowest total average rating of 2.417. This means 
that all factors (apart from risk perception) identified from the literature and from the 
first stage of this study are valid in a hospitality context. The top five primary factors 
are objectives, CEO risk propensity, risk capacity, risk culture and stakeholder 
demands. The top three secondary factors are leverage, risk management capability 
and Board risk propensity. 
It is worth noting that Board risk propensity was rated considerably lower than 
that of the CEO risk propensity and Executive Committee risk propensity. In 
company B, Board risk propensity was even considered as a ‘less important’ factor. 
This is quite interesting as the literature (McNulty et al., 2013; Sahaym et al., 2016) 
suggests that the Board should define and articulate their company’s risk appetite. 
However, this was not the case in both companies as the task was delegated to the 
CEO with the support from the Executive Committee. This was explained by A1 who 
said that the CEO and Executive Committee are ‘much closer to the  company than 
the Board [of independent directors], hence they have better knowledge about the 
company and are better positioned to make more informed decisions than the Board’. 
This finding demonstrates that it is the top management team (i.e. CEO and Executive 
Committee) rather than the Board that plays a central role in driving a company’s risk 
decision making (Sahaym et al., 2016). Given the observation that companies which 
are predominantly led by their senior management team are prone to take higher risks 
than they should (McNulty et al., 2013), it is critical for hotel companies to 
understand the consequences of this ‘shift’ in risk decision-making, and for Boards to 
ensure a careful consideration of the risk propensity of their CEO and other Executive 
Committee members when appointing them. Boards must also exercise stronger 
oversight to ensure that the risk propensity of their CEO and the Executive Committee 
is at an appropriate level which is less likely to drive unnecessary risk taking. 
 
4.2.3 Nature of influence on risk appetite 
 
 
The last question in Stage Two explored the nature of influence that the 
determinant factors have on risk appetite. In the outset of the study, it was assumed 
that the influence of the framework factors on risk appetite would either be positive 
(stronger factor - higher risk appetite) or negative (stronger factor – lower risk 
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appetite). However, the executives’ responses showed that, for certain factors, the 
influence on risk appetite may be both positive and negative under different 
circumstances. The letter ‘M’ was used to indicate such a ‘mixed’ influence. 
 
The findings presented in Table 5 showed that while regulation was undisputedly 
noted as having a negative influence on risk appetite, objectives, CEO risk propensity, 
Executive Committee risk propensity, executive remuneration, competition and CEO 
emotions were unanimously acknowledged to drive risk appetite. 
 
 
 
 
Factors 
Number of 
executive 
mention 
(Company A) 
Number of 
executive 
mention 
(Company B) 
   
 
Total 
 
 + M - + M - + M - 
Primary          
Objectives 8 0 0 8 0 0 16 0 0 
CEO risk propensity 8 0 0 8 0 0 16 0 0 
Executive Committee risk 
propensity 
 
8 
 
0 
 
0 
 
8 
 
0 
 
0 
 
16 
 
0 
 
0 
Executive remuneration 8 0 0 7 0 0 15 0 0 
Risk culture 7 0 1 5 0 2 12 0 3 
Risk capacity 6 0 2 5 0 1 11 0 3 
Regulation 0 0 6 0 0 4 0 0 10 
Stakeholder demands 6 1 0 3 2 1 9 3 1 
Performance 4 1 2 5 2 0 9 3 2 
History of risk taking 2 4 1 5 2 0 7 6 1 
Firm size 2 0 2 3 0 0 5 0 2 
Secondary          
Board risk propensity 8 0 0 6 0 2 14 0 2 
Competition 8 0 0 6 0 0 14 0 0 
Risk management capability 7 1 0 6 0 0 13 1 0 
CEO emotions 2 0 0 7 0 0 9 0 0 
Risk perception 2 0 4 2 0 4 4 0 8 
Leverage 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 0 6 
Note: +/M/- represents positive/mixed/negative influence on risk appetite 
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Regarding executive remuneration, many executives noted that if it is designed in 
a short-sighted, target-oriented way that rewards short-term performance, it could 
induce careless and excessive risk-taking behaviour from the company. This is 
because executives are likely to become overly focused on achieving performance 
targets and as such may overlook other crucial aspects of hotel company growth, such 
as ‘the credibility of the owner, the specific location and the market prospects’ (B3). 
Eventually, hotel development projects could be problematic and even fail to convert 
into actual hotel openings. More importantly, two executives (A4, A8) commented 
that a short-sighted remuneration mechanism may ‘foster an inappropriate company 
culture that aligns risk-taking decisions to short-term targets’ (A8), rather than the 
company’s long-term strategy and sustainability. Therefore, hotel companies should 
carefully design their executive remuneration, perhaps in a way that rewards ‘quality 
strategic growth’ (A1), i.e. growth in the company’s strategic markets where the 
relationship between hotel company and hotel owner (franchisee) remains strong. 
Apart from the factors mentioned above, the nature of influence on risk appetite 
for the remaining factors was pretty much debated, with many executives suggesting a 
positive influence on risk appetite while others a negative one. Notable factors in this 
category include risk culture, risk capacity and Board risk propensity. For example, 
twelve informants (seven from company A and five from company B) posited that 
strong risk culture leads to an increased risk appetite explaining that ‘a strong risk 
culture ensures that the company’s risks are sufficiently recognised and managed’ 
(B7). On the other hand, three executives (one from company A and one from 
company B) commented that such a risk culture also indicates ‘a high level of risk 
awareness across the company’, which may render senior management ‘overly 
sensitive to potential risks’ (A6) and thus become less effective in analysing the 
relevance of risk information. The amount of information may then overwhelm senior 
management, decrease their efficiency for making decisions and thus ‘possibly miss 
rewarding opportunities’ (B8). Hotel companies, therefore, need to understand that 
while there is value to foster a strong risk culture, it is important to ensure that this 
culture does not impede ‘a balanced approach between risks and rewards’ (B8). 
Factors that have mixed influence on risk appetite, depending on particular 
environmental and organisational circumstances, were found to be company’s history 
of risk taking, performance and stakeholder demands. For example, a company’s 
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history (track record) in risk taking was found particularly controversial. An executive 
(B6) characterised it as ‘a vital source of reference to make future risk decisions’ and 
many executives (two from company A and five from company B) as a factor with 
positive influence on risk appetite. Whilst a strong track record in risk taking 
strengthens risk appetite due to enhanced senior management confidence, a weaker 
track record would more likely reduce risk appetite as it could indicate that the 
company is not as effective in understanding and managing risks. However, almost as 
many executives felt that a strong prior track of successful risk-taking would have 
different impact on risk appetite from a strong track of unsuccessful risk-taking. This 
view appears reasonable, even if the relevant literature (Carpenter et al., 2003), posits 
that prior failures are valuable knowledge that subsequently improves the company’s 
willingness to take future risk as it understands risk better and can therefore manage it 
more effectively. 
In addition, whilst the influence of performance on risk appetite was widely noted 
across executives from both companies, the nature of that influence seems to be 
dependent upon the company’s ‘state of performance’ (B1), i.e. well-performing or 
under-performing. A company that is meeting its targets or on course to meet the 
targets is considered as well-performing, whereas one is struggling or fails to meet the 
targets is considered as under-performing. Although there is consensus that under- 
performing companies tend to take an increased level of risk to ‘generate more 
rewards to compensate for the poor performance’ (A5), disparity exists with regard to 
well-performing companies. Despite the view of five executives (three from company 
A and two from company B) that well-performing companies tend to become more 
conservative in risk taking since they wants to ‘maintain its momentum’ (A7) and not 
wish to take unnecessary chances that might ‘jeopardise its good performance’ (A1), 
twelve executives (five from company and seven from company B) commented that 
well-performing companies would ‘almost always be required to stretch further and 
take on extra risks’ (B3). While informant A7 explained that this further stretch is due 
to the preference from the Board and the investors towards a steadily improved 
performance over a sustained performance, A2 commented that such a decision is a 
perfect example of ‘human greed’, which fundamentally drives firm risk-seeking 
behaviour. 
Moreover, executives from both companies confirmed that their companies 
actively seek and consider stakeholder demands, particularly from shareholders and 
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hotel owners, in their strategic decision making process. According to two informants 
(A4, B3), this is due to the ‘company-wide adoption of the asset-light approach to 
growth’, where securing funding from investors and maintaining relationships with 
existing hotel owners is ‘of paramount importance for the company to grow its market 
share and compete with other rivals’ (B3). While many executives noted that 
investors typically push a company to engage in more risk-seeking activities for an 
increased return on investment, informants A5 and B6 argued that such a demand can 
also provoke risk-averse behaviour, where the company is likely to ‘halt its risk- 
seeking projects and adopt a conservative approach to reducing operational costs’ in 
order to drive return. It was also noted that different types of stakeholders may 
demand the company to behave differently towards risk. While hotel owners and 
guests normally ask a company to take more risks to innovate its products and 
services, others stakeholders such as governments and regulators tend to ‘use laws 
and regulations to confine a company’s risk appetite’ (A7). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that Stage Two did not reveal any sector-specific 
factors influencing the risk appetite of hotel companies. All factors confirmed by 
hotel executives in this study as influencing their company’s risk appetite can be 
applied to companies in other sectors such as tourism, financial services or 
manufacturing. A possible explanation for this could be that all informants were 
corporate executives of major hotel groups and companies like these behave just like 
any other company in the corporate world. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify and explore the factors that determine 
risk appetite in a hotel company context. Bringing together definitions from several 
strands of risk literature, risk appetite was defined as ‘a company’s dynamic desire for 
risk-taking to achieve its strategic objectives at a particular point in time’. Following 
a literature review, seventeen factors that influence risk appetite were identified and 
classified as organisational, decision-maker and environmental but also in terms of 
their level of perceived influence on risk appetite as primary and secondary. Some of 
these of factors (e.g., objectives, CEO risk propensity and executive remuneration) 
increase a hotel-company‟s risk appetite while others (e.g., regulation) decrease its 
risk appetite. An interesting finding was that for some factors (such as history and 
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track record of risk taking and performance), the nature of influence on a company’s 
risk appetite may change under different circumstances. Overall, the study showed 
that these seventeen factors could be applied to all types of companies as no one 
factor has hospitality-specific characteristics. 
These findings can be used by decision makers and risk managers to better 
understand and analyse the drivers and inhibitors of their company’s risk appetite. 
The factors may also be used to decode and analyse competitors‟ risk appetites and 
gain better insights of competitors’ risk-taking behaviour. Researchers can use these 
factors as a basis for modelling risk appetite and examine the inter-relationships and 
explore their mediating or moderating roles. Finally, given that the factors identified 
in this study did not have any hospitality-specific characteristics since the sample was 
drawn from large corporates, it would be interesting to conduct a study with owners 
and managers of smaller hotel companies or individual hotels in order to reveal 
perhaps more hospitality-specific factors influencing their risk appetite. 
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